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Abstract 
Data mining has been a popular research area for 
more than a decade due to its vast spectrum of 
applications. The power of data mining tools to extract 
hidden information that cannot be otherwise seen by 
simple querying proved to be useful. However, the 
popularity and wide availability of data mining tools also 
raised concerns about the privacy of individuals. The aim 
of privacy preserving data mining researchers is to 
develop data mining techniques that could be applied on 
databases without violating the privacy of individuals. 
Privacy preserving techniques for various data mining 
models have been proposed, initially for classification on 
centralized data then for association rules in distributed 
environments. In this work, we propose methods for 
constructing the dissimilarity matrix of objects from 
different sites in a privacy preserving manner which can 
be used for privacy preserving clustering as well as 
database joins, record linkage and other operations that 
require pair-wise comparison of individual private data 
objects horizontally distributed to multiple sites. 
1. Introduction 
Data mining research deals with the extraction of 
potentially useful information from large collections of 
data with a variety of application areas such as customer 
relationship management, market basket analysis, and 
bioinformatics. The extracted information could be in the 
form of patterns, clusters or classification models. 
Association rules in a supermarket for example could 
describe the relationship among items bought together. 
Customers could be clustered in segments for better 
customer relationship management. Classification models 
could be built on customer profiles and shopping 
behavior to do targeted marketing.  
The power of data mining tools to extract hidden 
information from large collections of data lead to 
increased data collection efforts by companies and 
government agencies. Naturally this raised privacy 
concerns about collected data. In response to that, data 
mining researchers started to address privacy concerns by 
developing special data mining techniques under the 
framework of “privacy preserving data mining”. Opposed 
to regular data mining techniques, privacy preserving data 
mining can be applied to databases without violating the 
privacy of individuals. Privacy preserving techniques for 
many data mining models have been proposed in the past 
5 years. Agrawal and Srikant from IBM Almaden 
proposed data perturbation techniques for privacy 
preserving classification model construction on 
centralized data [10]. Techniques for privacy preserving 
association rule mining in distributed environments were 
proposed by Kantarcioglu and Clifton [11].  Privacy 
preserving techniques for clustering over vertically 
partitioned data was proposed by Vaidya and Clifton [12]. 
In this paper, we propose a privacy preserving clustering 
technique on horizontally partitioned data. Our method is 
based on constructing the dissimilarity matrix of objects 
from different sites in a privacy preserving manner which 
can be used for privacy preserving clustering, as well as 
database joins, record linkage and other operations that 
require pair-wise comparison of individual private data 
objects distributed over multiple sites. We handle both 
numeric and alphanumeric valued attributes.   
Most clustering algorithms handle only numerical and 
categorical data. However, especially in the area of 
bioinformatics, researchers may be interested in 
clustering alphanumeric data as well. Consider the 
following real-world problem: Several institutions are 
gathering DNA data of individuals infected with bird flu 
and want to cluster this data in order to diagnose the 
disease. Since DNA data is private, these institutions can 
not simply aggregate their data for processing but should 
run a privacy preserving clustering protocol. 
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows: 
x Introduction of a protocol for secure multi-party 
computation of a dissimilarity matrix over 
horizontally partitioned data, 
x Proof of security of the protocol, analysis of 
communication costs 
x Secure comparison methods for numeric, 
alphanumeric and categorical attributes, 
x Application to privacy preserving clustering. 
In the following sections, we provide the background 
and related work together with the problem formulation. 
We then provide privacy preserving comparison protocols 
for numeric, alphanumeric and categorical attributes that 
will later be used for dissimilarity matrix construction. 
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The global dissimilarity matrix is a generic data structure 
that describes the pair-wise distances among objects and 
it can be used by any standard clustering algorithm, 
therefore we only provide the communication cost and 
security analysis of our privacy preserving comparison 
protocols. 
2. Related work and background 
Researchers developed methods to enable data mining 
techniques to be applied while preserving the privacy of 
individuals. Mainly two approaches are employed in these 
methods: data sanitization and secure multi-party 
computation. Data mining on sanitized data results in loss 
of accuracy, while secure multi-party computation 
protocols give accurate results at the expense of high 
computation or communication costs. Most data mining 
techniques, i.e. association rule mining and classification, 
are well studied by followers of both approaches. [9] and 
[10] are data sanitization techniques; [11], [12] and [13] 
are based on secure multi-party computation techniques. 
Privacy preserving clustering is not studied as 
intensively as other data mining techniques. In [1] and 
[2], Oliveira and Zaïane focus on different transformation 
techniques that enable the data owner to share the mining 
data with another party who will cluster it. In [3], they 
propose new methods for clustering centralized data: 
dimensionality reduction and object similarity based 
representation. Methods in [3] are also applicable on 
vertically partitioned data, in which case each partition is 
transformed by its owner and joined by one of the 
involved parties who will construct a dissimilarity matrix 
to be input to hierarchical clustering algorithms. [4] and 
[5] propose model-based solutions for the privacy 
preserving clustering problem. Data holder parties build 
local models of their data that is subject to privacy 
constraints. Then a third party builds a global model from 
these local models and cluster the data generated by this 
global model. All of these works follow the sanitization 
approach and therefore trade-off accuracy versus privacy. 
Except [4], none of them address privacy preserving 
clustering on horizontally partitioned data. 
Clifton and Vaidya propose a secure multi-party 
computation of k-means algorithm on vertically 
partitioned data in [6]. More recent work in [7] by Kruger 
et al. proposes a privacy preserving, distributed k-means 
protocol on horizontally partitioned data. We primarily 
focus on hierarchical clustering methods in this paper, 
rather than partitioning methods that tend to result in 
spherical clusters. Hierarchical methods can both discover 
clusters of arbitrary shapes and deal with different data 
types. For example, partitioning algorithms can not 
handle string data type for which a “mean” is not defined.  
Private comparison of sequences of letters chosen 
from a finite alphabet is also related to our work since we 
aim at clustering alphanumeric attributes as well. Atallah 
et al. proposes an edit distance computation protocol in 
[8]. The algorithm is not feasible for clustering private 
data due to high communication costs. We propose a new 
protocol for comparing alphanumeric attributes. 
Our work is closest to [3] and [7] since we consider 
the problem of privacy preserving clustering on 
horizontally partitioned data by means of secure multi-
party computation of the global dissimilarity matrix 
which can then be input to hierarchical clustering 
methods. There is no loss of accuracy as is the case in [3], 
clustering method is independent of partitioning methods 
and alphanumeric attributes can be used in clustering with 
the proposed protocols. Our dissimilarity matrix 
construction algorithm is also applicable to privacy 
preserving record linkage and outlier detection problems. 
2.1. Data matrix 
A data matrix is an object-by-variable structure. Each 
row in the matrix represents an entity through values of 
its attributes stored in columns. An mun data matrix is the 
data of m objects on n attributes as depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Data matrix 
The attributes of objects are not necessarily chosen 
from the same domain. In this paper, we focus on 
categorical, numerical and alphanumerical attributes. 
Each data type requires different comparison functions 
and corresponding protocols. Therefore local data 
matrices are usually accessed in columns, denoted as Di
for the ith attribute of a data matrix D. Notice that Di is a 
vector of size m. Size of Di is denoted as Di.Length. 
Data matrix D is said to be horizontally partitioned if 
rows of D are distributed among different parties. In that 
case each party j has its own data matrix, denoted as Dj.
Dji denotes the ith column of party j’s data matrix, Dj.
Data matrix is not normalized in our protocol. We 
rather choose to normalize the dissimilarity matrix. The 
reason is that each horizontal partition may contain values 
from a different range in which case another privacy 
preserving protocol for finding the global minimum and 
maximum of each attribute would be required. 
Normalization on the dissimilarity matrix yields the same 
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effect, without loss of accuracy and the need for another 
protocol. 
2.2. Dissimilarity matrix 
A dissimilarity matrix is an object-by-object structure. 
An mum dissimilarity matrix stores the distance or 
dissimilarity between each pair of objects as depicted in 
Figure 2. Intuitively, the distance of an object to itself is 
0. Also notice that only the entries below the diagonal are 
filled, since d[i][j] = d[j][i], due to symmetric nature of 
the comparison functions. 
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Figure 2. Dissimilarity matrix 
Each party that holds a horizontal partition of a data 
matrix D can construct its local dissimilarity matrix as 
long as comparison functions for object attributes are 
public. However privacy preserving comparison protocols 
need to be employed in order to calculate an entry d[i][j] 
of dissimilarity matrix d, if objects i and j are not held by 
the same party. 
Involved parties construct separate dissimilarity 
matrices for each attribute in our protocol. Then these 
matrices are merged into a single matrix using a weight 
function on the attributes. The dissimilarity matrix for 
attribute i is denoted as di.
2.3. Comparison functions 
The distance between two numeric attributes is simply 
the absolute value of the difference between them. 
Categorical attributes are only compared for equality so 
that any categorical value is equally distant to all other 
values but itself. The distance between alphanumeric 
attributes is measured in terms of the edit distance that is 
heavily used in bioinformatics. 
Edit distance algorithm returns the number of 
operations required to transform a source string into a 
target string. Available operations are insertion, deletion 
and transformation of a character. The algorithm makes 
use of the dynamic programming paradigm. An (n+1) u
(m+1) matrix is iteratively filled, where n and m are 
lengths of source and target strings respectively. 
Comparison result is symmetric with respect to the inputs. 
Details of the algorithm can be found in [8].  
Input of the edit distance algorithm need not be the 
input strings. An num equality comparison matrix for all 
pairs of characters in source and target strings is equally 
expressive. We call such matrices “character comparison 
matrices” and denote them as CCMST for source string s 
and target string t. CCMST[i][j] is 0 if the ith character of s 
is equal to the jth character of t and non-zero otherwise. 
3. Problem formulation 
In this section, we formally define the problem, give 
details on trust levels of the involved parties and the 
amount of preliminary information that must be known by 
each one. 
There are k data holders, such that k t 2, each of 
which owns a horizontal partition of the data matrix D, 
denoted as Dk. These parties want to cluster their data by 
means of a third party so that the clustering results will be 
public to data holders at the end of the protocol. The third 
party, denoted as TP, does not have any data but serves as 
a means of computation power and storage space. Third 
party’s duty in the protocol is to govern the 
communication between data holders, construct the 
dissimilarity matrix and publish clustering results to data 
holders. 
Every party, including the third party, is semi-trusted, 
that is to say, they follow the protocol as they are 
supposed to but may store any data that is revealed to 
them in order to infer private information in the future. 
Semi-trusted behavior is also called honest-but-curious 
behavior. Involved parties are also assumed to be non-
colluding. 
Every data holder and the third party must have access 
to the comparison functions so that they can compute 
distance/dissimilarity between objects. Data holders are 
supposed to have previously agreed on the list of 
attributes that are going to be used for clustering 
beforehand. This attribute list is also shared with the third 
party so that TP can run appropriate comparison functions 
for different data types. 
At the end of the protocol, the third party will have 
constructed the dissimilarity matrices for each attribute 
separately. These dissimilarity matrices are weighted 
using a weight vector sent by data holders such that the 
final dissimilarity matrix is built. Then the third party 
runs a hierarchical clustering algorithm on the final 
dissimilarity matrix and publishes the results. Every data 
holder can impose a different weight vector and 
clustering algorithm of his own choice.
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Figure 3. Sample numeric data comparison 
4. Comparison protocols 
As described in Section 2.2, dissimilarity matrix, d, is 
an object-by-object structure in which d[i][j] is the 
distance between objects i and j. Now consider an entry in 
d, d[i][j]: If both objects are held by the same data holder, 
the third party need not intervene in the computation of 
the distance between objects i and j. The data holder that 
is holding these objects simply computes the distance 
between them and sends the result to the third party. 
However, if objects i and j are from different parties, a 
privacy preserving comparison protocol must be 
employed between owners of these objects. It follows 
from this distinction that, in order to construct the 
dissimilarity matrix, each data holder must send its local 
dissimilarity matrix to the third party and also run a 
privacy preserving comparison protocol with every other 
data holder. Evidently, if there are k data holders, 
comparison protocol for each attribute must be repeated 
C(n, 2) times, for every pair of data holders. 
In this section we describe the comparison protocols 
for numeric, alphanumeric and categorical attributes that 
will be the building blocks of the dissimilarity matrix 
construction algorithm explained in the next section. 
Security and communication cost analysis of the 
protocols are provided right after the protocols are 
presented. 
4.1. Numeric attributes 
Distance function for numeric attributes is the 
absolute value of the difference between the values, 
formally:  
distance(x, y) = | x – y |. 
There are three participants of the protocol: data 
holders DHJ and DHK and the third party, TP. DHJ and 
DHK share a secret number rJ K that will be used as the 
seed of a pseudo-random number generator, rngJK. 
Similarly DHJ and TP share a secret number rJ T that will 
be used as the seed of a pseudo-random number 
generator, rngJT. 
Suppose that parties DHJ and DHK want to compute 
the distance between two integers x and y, held by each 
site respectively. A naïve protocol for comparing x and y 
without using the random number generator rngJK would 
be as follows: DHJ generates a random number r using 
rngJT and sends (r+x) to DHK. Since r disguises the value 
of x, there is no information leak. DHK then subtracts y 
from (r+x) and sends (r+x-y) to TP, who can generate the 
same random number r, since TP and DHJ share the seed 
of rngJT. TP subtracts r from (r+x-y) and successfully 
computes |x - y|, result of the distance function. However 
in this protocol TP can find out whether x is larger than y 
or vice versa. A positive distance value implies that x > y 
because y is subtracted from x. 
In order to prevent possible inferences based on the 
above information leak, the input that will be negated 
should be chosen arbitrarily. What’s more is that both 
DHJ and DHK should know which input will be negated. 
Shared random number generator rngJK addresses this 
problem. If the random number generated by rngJK is 
odd, DHJ negates its input. Otherwise, DHK does. The 
protocol is demonstrated in Figure 3 below. x and y are 
private inputs of data holder sites and RJK and RJT are the 
random numbers generated by pseudo-random number 
generators rngJK and rngJT respectively. 
Sites DHJ, DHK and TP can privately compute the 
distance function using this refined protocol. However the 
protocol has to be repeated for each object pair. A final 
adjustment solves this problem and enables batch 
processing of inputs at all sites. Site DHJ processes each 
value in DHJ (data vector at site j) using both rngJK and 
rngJT and sends the resulting vector to site DHK. Site 
DHK initializes a matrix of size DHK .Length u DHJ
.Length to be sent to site TP. This matrix is filled row by 
row, each row containing intermediary comparison values 
for an input from DHK against all inputs from DHJ. At the 
end of each row, DHK should re-initialize rngJK using the 
seed rJ K to be able to remember the oddness/evenness of 
the random numbers generated at site DHJ. Finally, site 
TP, upon receiving this matrix, subtracts the random 
numbers generated by rngJT. Similarly TP should re-
initialize rngJT at each row, since all numbers in a 
column are disguised using the same random number by 
DHJ.
x = 3 
RJK = 5 
RJT = 7 
x’ = 3u-15 % 2 = -3 
x’’ = -3 + 7 = 4  
y = 8 
RJK = 5 
y’ = 8u-1(5+1) % 2 = 8 
m = 8 + 4 = 12 
RJT = 7 
|x – y| = |12 – 7| 
            = 5 
x’’ 
m
Site DHJ Site DHK Site TP 
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INPUT: Pseudo-random number generator seeds rJ K and rJ T, Input data vector DHJ
OUTPUT: Data vector DH’J
Begin 
     1. Initialize rngJK with seed rJ K 
     2. Initialize rngJT with seed rJ T
     3. Initialize data vector: DH’J = {DHJ .Length} 
For m = 0 to DHJ .Length-1 
          4. DH’J [m] = rngJT.Next( ) + DHJ [m]u-1rngJK.Next( )%2
     5. Send DH’J to site DHK
End
Figure 4. Pseudocode of numeric attribute comparison at site DHJ
INPUT: Pseudo-random number generator seed rJ K, Input data vectors DHK and DH’J
OUTPUT: Pair-wise comparison matrix s 
Begin 
     1. Initialize rngJT with seed rJ T 
     2. Initialize comparison matrix: s = {DHK .Length u DH’J .Length} 
For m = 0 to DHK .Length-1 
          For n = 0 to DH’J .Length-1 
               3. s[m] [n] = DH’J [n] + DHK [m] u-1(rngJK.Next( ) + 1)%2
          4. Re-initialize rngJK with seed rJ K
     5. Send s to size TP 
End
Figure 5. Pseudocode of numeric attribute comparison at site DHK
INPUT: Pseudo-random number generator seed rJ T, Pair-wise comparison matrix s 
OUTPUT: Dissimilarity matrix component for DHJ and DHK, J_K 
Begin 
     1. Initialize rngJT with seed rJ T
     2. Initialize matrix of distance values: J_K = {s.Length u s[0].Length} 
For m = 0 to s.Length-1 
          For n = 0 to s[0].Length-1 
               3. J_K[m] [n] = | s[m] [n] – rngJT.Next( ) | 
          4. Re-initialize rngJT with seed rJ T
End
Figure 6. Pseudocode of numeric attribute comparison at site TP 
Pseudocode for the comparison protocol of integers is 
given in Figures 4, 5 and 6. For other data types, i.e. real 
values, only data type of the vector DH’J and the random 
numbers generated by rngJT need to be changed. 
Analysis of communication costs and privacy
We denote data sizes for parties DHJ and DHK as n 
and m respectively. Communication cost of the protocol 
at the initiator site, DHJ, is O(n2+n). O(n2) is the cost of 
sending local dissimilarity matrix to the third party and 
O(n) is the cost of sending disguised values to site DHK.
O(n2+n) is practically O(n2) for large values of n. At site 
DHK, communication cost of the protocol is O(m2+mun). 
Again O(m2) is the local dissimilarity matrix cost and 
O(mun) is the cost of sending matrix s to the third party.  
Our comparison protocol preserves privacy as long as 
a high quality pseudo-random number generator, that has 
a long period and that is not predictable, is used and the 
channels are secured. Proposing such a pseudo-random 
number generator or analyzing existing generators is out 
of the scope of this work. We assume that an appropriate 
pseudo-random number generator is available. 
The message x’’ is practically a random number for 
party DHK since the pseudo-random number generated 
using rngJT is not available. Inference by TP, using 
message m, is not possible since given r(x-y) there are 
infinitely many points that are | x –y | apart of each other. 
The very same idea is used and explained in detail in 
Section 5. 
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Figure 7. Sample alphanumeric data comparison 
We now explain the reason why the channels must be 
secured. TP can predict the values of both x and y if he 
listens the channel between DHJ and DHK. Notice that x’’ 
= r r x and TP knows the value of r. Therefore he infers 
that the value of x is either (x’’– r) or (r – x’’). For each 
possible value of x, y can take two values: either                
(x – | x – y |) or (x + | x – y |). In order to prevent such 
inferences, the channel between DHJ and DHK must be 
secured. Another thread is eavesdropping by DHJ on the 
channel between DHK and TP. This channel carries the 
message m = r r (x – y) and DHJ knows the values of 
both r and x. Therefore this channel must be secured as 
well. 
Although comparing a pair of numeric inputs using 
our protocol preserves privacy, as shown above, 
comparing many pairs at once introduces a thread of 
privacy breaches by means of a frequency analysis attack 
by the third party, TP. Notice that ith column of the pair-
wise comparison matrix s, received by TP from DHK, is 
“private data vector of DHK” plus “identity vector times 
(ith input of DHJ – ith random number of rngJT)” or 
negation of the expression. If the range of values for 
numeric attributes is limited and there is enough statistics 
to realize a frequency attack, TP can infer input values of 
site DHK. In such cases, site DHK can request omitting 
batch processing of inputs and using unique random 
numbers for each object pair. 
4.2. Alphanumeric attributes 
Alphanumeric attributes are compared in terms of the 
edit distance. Similar to the comparison protocol for 
numeric attributes, two data holder parties and a third 
party are involved in the protocol. While data holders 
DHJ and DHK build their local dissimilarity matrices 
using the edit distance algorithm, third party can not use 
this algorithm to compare inputs from distinct data 
sources since input strings, source and target, are private 
information in the latter case. Therefore we devise a new 
protocol below, which allows the third party to securely 
compute the distance between all inputs of data holders. 
The idea behind the protocol is privately building a 
character comparison matrix (CCM), as explained in 
Section 2.3. 
Alphabet of the strings that are to be compared is 
assumed to be finite. This assumption enables modulo 
operations on alphabet size, such that addition of a 
random number and a character is another alphabet 
character.  
The third party and data holder party DHJ shares a 
secret number which will be seed of a pseudo-random 
number generator. In order to compare a string s at site 
DHJ with a string t at site DHK, DHJ first generates a 
random vector of size s.Length and add this random 
vector to s. The outcome, denoted as s’, is practically a 
random vector for DHK. DHJ sends s’ to DHK, who 
generates t.Length copies of s’ and builds a matrix of size 
(t.Length)u(s’.Length). Then DHK subtracts its input, t, 
from every column of the matrix and sends the resultant 
matrix to the third party. The third party can generate the 
same pseudo-random numbers as DHJ since they share 
the seed to the generator. Finally the third party generates 
the same random vector of size s’.Length as DHJ did and 
subtracts this vector from every row of the matrix 
received from DHK to obtain the CCM for s and t.  
A simple demonstration of the protocol is given in 
Figure 7. R is the random vector generated using the 
pseudo-random number generator. Alphabet is assumed 
to be A = { a, b, c, d }. Site TP can construct the CCM for 
the compared strings: CCM[0][1] = a = 0, which implies 
that s[1] = t[0], as is the case. 
Comparison of multiple strings at once requires an 
extension to the above protocol: DHJ re-initializes its 
pseudo-random number generator with the same seed 
after disguising each input string. Correspondingly, the 
third party should re-initialize its generator after 
successfully decoding each CCM. Pseudo-code for this 
extended comparison protocol is given in Figures 8, 9 and 
10.  
Analysis of communication costs and privacy
Data holder party DHJ sends its local dissimilarity 
matrix to the third party and a vector of exactly the same 
size of its input to DHK. If DHJ has n inputs of at most p 
characters, its communication cost is O(n2+nup).  
Site DHJ Site DHK Site TP 
S = “abc” 
R = “013” 
S’ = “acb ” 
T = “bd” 
M = »
¼
º
«
¬
ª


dbdcda
bbbcba = »
¼
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«
¬
ª
cdb
abd
R = “013” 
CCM = »
¼
º
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         = »
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M
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INPUT: Pseudo-random number generator seed rJ T, Input data vector DHJ
OUTPUT: Data vector DH’J
Begin 
     1. Initialize rngJT with seed rJ T
     2. Initialize data vector: DH’J = {DHJ . Length} 
For m = 0 to DHJ .Length-1 
For p = 0 to DHJ [m] . Length-1 
               3. DH’J [m] [p] = DHJ [m] [p] + rngJT.Next( ) 
          4. Re-initialize rngJT with seed rJ T
     5. Send DH’J to site DHK
End
Figure 8. Pseudocode of alphanumeric attribute comparison at site DHJ
INPUT: Input data vectors DHK and DH’J
OUTPUT: Pair-wise, intermediary CCM matrix M 
Begin 
     1. Initialize CCM matrix: M = {DHK . Length u DHJ . Length} 
For m = 0 to DHK .Length-1 
For n = 0 to DH’J .Length-1 
               2. Initialize CCM: M [m] [n] = {DHK [m].Length u DH’J [n].Length} 
For q = 0 to DHK [m] . Length-1 
                    For p = 0 to DH’J [n] . Length-1 
                         3. M [m] [n] [q] [p] = DH’J [n] [p] – DHK [m] [q] 
     4. Send M to site TP 
End
Figure 9. Pseudocode of alphanumeric attribute comparison at site DHK
INPUT: Pseudo-random number generator seed rJ T, Intermediary CCM matrix M 
OUTPUT: Dissimilarity matrix component for DHJ and DHK, J_K 
Begin 
     1. Initialize rngJT with seed rJ T
     2. Initialize matrix of distance values: J_K = {M.Length u M[0].Length} 
For m = 0 to M.Length-1 
For n = 0 to M[0] .Length-1 
For q = 0 to M[m] [n].Length-1 
                    For p = 0 to M[m] [n] [q].Length-1 
                         If M [m] [n] [q] [p] – rngJT.Next( ) = = 0 
                              3. M [m] [n] [q] [p] = 0 
                         Else 
                              4. M [m] [n] [q] [p] = 1 
                    5. Re-initialize rngJT with seed rJ T
               6. J_K[m] [n] = EditDistance (M [m] [n]) 
End
Figure 10. Pseudocode of alphanumeric attribute comparison at site TP 
Communication cost of Party DHK is 
O(m2+muqunup) where m is the data size and q is the 
longest input’s length. O(m2) is the transfer cost for local 
dissimilarity matrix and O(muqunup) is the transfer cost 
for intermediary CCMs. 
Privacy analysis of alphanumeric comparison protocol 
is similar to that of numeric comparison protocol. Vector 
s’ sent to DHK by DHJ is a random vector for DHK since 
he does not have access to the random number generator 
rngJT. Again, we are assuming that the pseudo-random 
number generator has a long period and is unpredictable. 
The message from DHK to TP contains the CCM for 
source and target strings and does not leak any private 
information. 
4.3. Categorical attributes 
Distance function for categorical attributes can be 
described as follows: 
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This distance function is not adequate to measure the 
dissimilarity between ordered or hierarchical categorical 
attributes. Such categorical data requires more complex 
distance functions which are left as future work. 
Comparison protocol for categorical attributes is quite 
intuitive. Data holder parties share a secret key to encrypt 
their data. Value of the categorical attribute is encrypted 
for every object at every site and these encrypted data are 
sent to the third party, who can easily compute the 
distance between categorical attributes of any pair of 
objects. If ciphertext of two categorical values are the 
same, then plaintexts must be the same. Third party 
merges encrypted data and runs the local dissimilarity 
matrix construction algorithm in Figure 12. Outcome is 
not a local dissimilarity matrix for the categorical 
attribute, since data from all parties is input to the 
algorithm.  
Analysis of communication costs and privacy
Each party sends its data in encrypted format, 
therefore communication cost for a party with n objects is 
O(n). 
The third party can not infer any private information 
unless the encryption key is available. However this is not 
possible since data holders and the third party are non-
colluding and semi-honest. 
5. Dissimilarity matrix construction 
In this section, we explain how to build dissimilarity 
matrices for different data types using the comparison 
protocols of Section 4. The third party should run the 
appropriate construction algorithm for every attribute in 
the list of attributes chosen for clustering such that a 
corresponding dissimilarity matrix is built. 
Construction algorithm for numeric and alphanumeric 
attributes are essentially the same. Every data holder first 
builds his local dissimilarity matrix according to Figure 
12 and sends the result to the third party. Then for each 
pair of data holders, the comparison protocol of the 
attribute is carried out. Finally the third party merges all 
portions of the dissimilarity matrix from local matrices 
and comparison protocol outputs. The process ends after a 
normalization step that scales distance values into [0, 1] 
interval. Details of the algorithm are given in Figure 11. 
Publishing local dissimilarity matrices does not cause 
private information leakage as proven in [3]. The proof 
relies on the fact that given the distance between two 
secret points, there are infinitely many pairs of points that 
are equally distant. Unless there is an inference channel 
that helps finding out one of these points, dissimilarity 
matrix sharing does not result in privacy breaches. For a 
more formal statement of the theorem and its proof, 
please refer to [3]. 
Construction algorithm for categorical data is much 
simpler. Data holders encrypt their local data and send 
them to the third party who will merge these encrypted 
data and run the local dissimilarity matrix construction 
algorithm on global data. 
INPUT: List of data holders DH 
OUTPUT: Dissimilarity matrix d 
Begin
     For each Data holder DHJ  DH 
          1. Request local dissimilarity matrix 
          For each Data holder DHK  DH and K > J 
               2. Run comparison protocol btw. DHJ and DHK
     3. Construct dissimilarity matrix d 
     4. Normalize: d[m][n] = d[m][n] / maximum value in d
End 
Figure 11. Pseudocode for dissimilarity matrix 
construction of numeric/alphanumeric attributes 
INPUT: Comparison function distance(), Data vector DJ
OUTPUT: Local dissimilarity matrix d 
Begin 
     1. Initialize d = {DJ .Length u DJ .Length}
     For m = 0 to DJ .Length-1 
          For n = 0 to m 
               2. d[m] [n] = distance(DJ [m], DJ [n]) 
End
Figure 12. Pseudocode for local dissimilarity 
matrix construction algorithm 
Upon construction of the dissimilarity matrices for all 
attributes, the third party notifies the data holders, asking 
for their attribute weight vectors and hierarchical 
clustering algorithm choices. Then dissimilarity matrices 
of attributes are merged into a final dissimilarity matrix, 
which will be input to the appropriate clustering 
algorithm. There is no privacy concern after the 
dissimilarity matrices are built, since the third party can 
run hierarchical clustering algorithms locally, without any 
intervention of the data holders. Therefore we omit the 
discussion on how clustering is actually performed. 
Dissimilarity matrices must be kept secret by the third 
party because data holder parties can use distance scores 
to infer private information since they have a portion of 
data. That’s why clustering results are published as a list 
of objects of each cluster. The third party can also provide 
clustering quality parameters such as average of square 
distance between members. A sample output is depicted 
in Figure 13. Xj denotes the object with id j at site X. 
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Cluster1 A1, A3, B4, C3
Cluster2 B2, B3, C1, C2
Cluster3 A2, B1
Figure 13. Sample Clustering Result 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we proposed a method for privacy 
preserving clustering over horizontally partitioned data. 
Our method is based on the dissimilarity matrix 
construction using a secure comparison protocol for 
numerical, and alphanumeric, and categorical data. 
Previous work on privacy preserving clustering over 
horizontally partitioned data was on a specific clustering 
algorithm and only for numerical attributes. The main 
advantage of our method is its generality in applicability 
to different clustering methods such as hierarchical 
clustering. Hierarchical clustering methods can both 
discover clusters of arbitrary shapes and deal with diverse 
data types. For example, we can cluster alphanumeric 
data that is of outmost importance in bioinformatics 
researches, besides numeric and categorical data. Another 
major contribution is that quality of the resultant clusters 
can easily be measured and conveyed to data owners 
without any leakage of private information. 
We also provided the security analysis and 
communication costs and observed that the 
communication costs of our protocols are parallel to the 
computation costs of the operations in case of centralized 
data. Although the constructed dissimilarity matrix is 
input to hierarchical clustering algorithms, there are 
various other application areas of the proposed protocols 
such as record linkage and outlier detection problems. 
As a future work, we plan to expand our privacy 
analysis for the comparison protocol of alphanumeric 
attributes so that possible attacks using statistics of the 
input language are addressed as well. However such 
analysis depends heavily on the intrinsic properties of the 
language, therefore building a general model is not an 
easy task. Even for specific languages (i.e. DNA), proper 
statistics is not readily available. 
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